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Abstract
The gender segregation of occupations is an enduring feature of the labour market, and pay in female-
dominated occupations remains lower than in male-dominated occupations. However, recent changes in
the occupational structure have possibly altered the relationship between occupational segregation and the
gender pay gap. Women’s skills are increasingly in demand, and this is reducing the gender wage gap. We
explore this premise using individual- and occupation-level Labour Force Survey and household panel data
from Britain augmented with an innovative proxy indicator of productivity across occupations. The wage ef-
fects of occupational feminization are not as high as previously shown once this indicator is taken into ac-
count. Additionally, we find evidence that such wage effects are evolving into more complex processes,
including differing impacts for graduates and non-graduates as well as for employees in graduate and non-
graduate jobs. Claims that gender segregation is losing importance as a structuring factor in labour-market
outcomes are therefore accurate. However, this applies mostly to women in jobs requiring high-level skills.
Segregation continues to lower pay substantially for women in occupations requiring limited skills.
Introduction
The gender segregation of occupations is a long-standing
feature of labour markets and is held to have pro-
nounced wage impacts. Occupations where women pre-
dominate generally pay less than those where men
predominate (England et al., 1994; Blau and Kahn,
2003; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009; Levanon,
England and Allison, 2009). Extensive research has
sought to unveil the reasons for this, often based on a
small number of important theoretical ideas, in particu-
lar human capital theory (Tam, 1997), gender role the-
ory (Lips, 2012; Ochsenfeld, 2014), and devaluation
theory (England, 1992, 2010; Perales, 2013).1
Recent evidence shows that both occupational gen-
der segregation and the gender wage gap are in decline,
if slowly (Hegewisch, Liepmann and Hartmann, 2010;
Olsen et al., 2010; American Association of University
Women, 2012). Rising female education has been cited
as an important mediating factor in these developments
(Weichselbaumer and Winter-Emer, 2005; Goldin,
2008). However, the role of education remains highly
uncertain. For instance, recent research in the USA has
unveiled a strong negative relationship between occupa-
tional feminization and earnings for the highly qualified
(Hegewisch, Liepmann and Hartmann, 2010). Even less
clear is whether the link between occupational gender
segregation and the gender pay gap is itself weakening,
as suggested by Charles and Grusky (2004). One prob-
lem is that the decline in segregation itself is not consist-
ent over time (Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012)
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or across countries (Rubery, 2008: 299–300; Bettio and
Verashchagina, 2009: 34–37). Further, insofar as the
narrowing of the gender wage gap is the result of the
growth in female skills, the decline in gender segregation
could be linked to the spread of egalitarian gender ideol-
ogies and mainstreaming policies. It is unlikely that a
single cause can explain the changing relationship be-
tween segregation and the gender wage gap.
Women’s education has risen and this might have
enabled women to enter professional jobs previously
dominated by men so that such jobs have become in-
creasingly integrated (England, 2010). However, it is
also possible that shifts in the occupational structure
have benefited women through creating more high-level
‘female’ jobs. There has been a long-run decline in
‘male-typed’ jobs involving physical strength or tech-
nical know-how (Oppenheimer 1970; Kucera and
Milberg, 2000; Goldin, 2002), and this has been accom-
panied by the rise of higher-end ‘post-industrial’, pre-
dominantly female occupations (Esping-Andersen,
1993)—now highly professionalized (de Ruijter, van
Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers, 2003). Primary school
teaching and social care are prime examples. They have
both in the past been tainted by low status and pay; yet,
in many countries these jobs now require graduate edu-
cation. This enables women, who have historically
favoured such work, to obtain higher pay on average
than they would otherwise (Disney and Gosling, 1998;
Dustmann and van Soest, 1998; Budria, 2010).
Nevertheless, this process only works if women special-
ize in skills which are in growing demand (Tam, 1997;
Krymkowski and Mintz, 2007).
While existing studies have focused chiefly on indi-
vidual skills, we use British data to test whether the
wage effects of occupational feminization diminish
when we control for an occupational level measure of
productivity. We find that the role of occupational gen-
der segregation in wage determination is weakening not
only through women’s growing educational advantage,
but because an increasing proportion of university-
educated women work in highly productive professions.
We therefore have a story of occupations and a story of
gender, which intersect yet remain distinct.
The Changing Relationship between
Occupational Gender Segregation,
Skill Demands, and Pay
Women are still over-represented in poorly paid occupa-
tions. Some claim that this is chiefly because of women
having lower human capital or productivity (Polachek,
1976, 1981; Tam, 1997; Polavieja 2008). However, the
rise in female education makes this general argument in-
creasingly difficult to maintain; women’s growing edu-
cational attainments are often cited as a major driver of
the decline in the gender wage gap (Goldin, 2002,
2008). Nevertheless, education is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for change in gender inequality to
take place. For example, access to education is still gen-
dered by prestige of institution and field of study
(Hakim, 1998; Booth and Kee, 2011). For one British
cohort (born 1958), Joshi and Paci (1998) find that edu-
cational achievement explains only about 10 per cent of
the gender wage gap. In another British study, education
explains 7 per cent compared with 62 per cent explained
by gender itself (Olsen et al., 2010). Many studies fail to
find a consistent or strong impact of education on the
gender pay gap (e.g. Aisenbrey and Bru¨ckner, 2008;
Magnusson, 2009).
It is implicit in the concept of the ‘glass ceiling’
(Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007) that highly edu-
cated women’s work is devalued (insofar as being female
limits promotion opportunities). In the USA at least the
gender wage gap is larger in more highly paid occupa-
tions (Evertsson et al., 2009; Hegewisch and Liepmann,
2010), while the feminization of occupations appears to
reduce returns to education for women in Britain (Joshi
and Paci, 1998: 71–96), Germany (Aisenbrey and
Bru¨ckner, 2008: 644), and the Netherlands (de Ruijter,
van Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers, 2003).
Nevertheless, the predictions of devaluation theory nei-
ther accord with the observed fall in the gender wage
gap (Jackson, 2008), nor with variation in segregation
and occupational wage gaps across countries (Bettio,
2002; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009). ‘Female’ work
is not paid uniformly poorly across countries, and many
jobs in which women predominate are not stereotypic-
ally ‘feminine’ (Hakim, 1998). Further, gender-
integrated occupations are generally better paid (Hakim,
1998; Cotter et al., 2004; Magnusson, 2013) and more
prestigious (Magnusson, 2009) than not only female-
dominated but also male-dominated occupations.
Occupational gender segregation has also been shown to
be positively related to measures of female empower-
ment at the aggregate level (Blackburn, Jarman and
Brooks, 2000).2
Our argument is that women have a comparative ad-
vantage in ‘skill’ (defined as the converse of ‘brawn’)
and therefore tend to select into skill-intensive occupa-
tions. If so, then skill-biased technological change
(Berman, Bound and Machin, 1997, Card and DiNardo,
2002), previously in favour of men, might raise the de-
mand for women’s capabilities and qualifications, thus
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contributing to a narrowing of the gender wage gap at
the top of the wage distribution.3 This has been
observed in both developing countries (Pitt, Rosenzweig
and Hassan, 2012; Bhalotra, Fernandez-Sierra and
Venkataramani, 2015) and developed countries
(Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2001), and
may explain why desegregation has occurred primarily
in middle-class jobs (England, 2010). Koppera and
Mehta’s (2014: 9) analysis of the Current Population
Survey in the USA explains the college boom in terms of
shifts in the ‘feminization of education-intensive jobs’.
Female enrolments are associated with increases in typ-
ically female jobs rather than with higher-level jobs in
general. There is a connection running from gendered
employment trends to gendered educational trends ra-
ther than the other way round.4
Whether female educational investments are in skill-in-
tensive sectors is rarely tested empirically. Some possible
examples are given by Magnusson (2013) for Sweden.
Like Hakim (1998), she finds that both men and women
receive the highest wages in integrated occupations (i.e. oc-
cupations in which 30–50 per cent of workers are
women), including some health and teaching professionals.
Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012: 136, 172) show
that in the USA, during an enormous expansion of profes-
sional jobs from around 1970 to 2000, (white) male repre-
sentation in this general sector fell, with the difference
being made up predominantly by (white) women.5 Even
‘caring’ occupations, deemed to be the heart of the devalu-
ation process (England, Budig and Folbre, 2002; England,
2005), are witnessing change of some benefit to women
(Esping-Andersen, 1993; Goldin, 2008). For instance, the
‘family going public’ involves the professionalization of
care work, mostly female dominated. As one example,
care of the elderly requires increasing skills as a result of
more client-focused approaches. These involve increasing
attention to the emotional and social needs of clients, and
a wider range of creative and interpersonal carer skills
(Dench, La Valle and Evans, 1999). This, though, is not a
linear pattern. Dwyer (2013) shows that in the USA from
1983 to 2007, demand for care work contributed consid-
erably to growth in both the lowest quintile of occupa-
tional wages and the highest. Magnusson (2009) finds the
relationship between care work and both occupational
prestige and wages in Sweden to be positive; female-domi-
nated ‘interpersonal service work’, in contrast, received
both low prestige and pay.
A counterargument has been proposed by Mandel
and Semyonov (2005), who make the case that while the
expansion of women’s work, predominantly in the pub-
lic sector, has boosted female employment, wage com-
pression in the sector has prevented women from
obtaining highly paid jobs equivalent to those in the pri-
vate sector, thus contributing to, not reducing, gender
wage inequality. However, it is difficult to demonstrate
that women would otherwise have achieved better pay
in high-level private-sector occupations, for instance in
finance. It has also been demonstrated that through
increased entry into ‘female’ professional jobs, women
have achieved high-level managerial positions that might
not have been attainable otherwise (England, 2010).
The problem is not the public sector, but the effects on
gender equality of continued privatization (Rubery,
Smith and Fagan, 1999). We note here, before presenta-
tion of our findings, that in the UK data set we use,
mean pay from 1993 to 2008 is higher in the public than
in the private sector for both men and women, while the
gender wage gap is higher in the latter. On the other
hand, restriction of the analysis to the relative highly
paid (over £10 per hour) virtually eliminates these
differences.
We have argued that segregation favours more-edu-
cated women while disadvantaging those who are less
educated. There is an important methodological point
here, in that the observed decline in the relationship be-
tween segregation and the gender wage gap masks two
opposed processes. This decline is not what it seems.
Segregation still remains important because it favours
highly-skilled women on the one hand but remains dam-
aging for the less skilled. In respect of the former, wom-
en’s occupational preferences that have been historically
to their detriment might now be working in their favour.
A corollary of this is that we need to distinguish be-
tween women’s work and women’s skills. With rare ex-
ceptions such as fashion modelling (male or female), but
also following the decline of heavy industries, there is lit-
tle work that both men and women cannot in principle
each do effectively (Hakim, 1998). There are no such
things as ‘female’ or ‘male’ skills. These are social arte-
facts derived from processes of segregation. However, if
the underlying principle of devaluation theory is that
women’s work is considered to be of lower value than
men’s—because historically ‘femininity’ has been attrib-
uted lower value—then it is inevitable that the skills
associated with the work that women do in typically fe-
male occupations will also be considered of lower value.
Women’s apparent (i.e. socially constructed) skills are
then devalued. This is changing, we argue, but not be-
cause segregation is declining and more women are
doing ‘men’s work’ (a process that is in fact extremely
slow), nor because women are now as well educated as
men (which would not help if women’s skills are deval-
ued). The change is the result of the fact that the skills
that women typically apply in segregated occupations
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are increasingly in demand. Devaluation is not an im-
mutable element of the social structure.
Occupational gender segregation is in this climate
about poorly skilled women being in dead-end jobs. To
make a simple but important point, gender equality
cannot come about through wage equality based on
highly educated women’s skills matching those of men
as long as women continue to be over-represented in
low-paid occupations (Joshi and Paci, 1998: 71–96;
OECD, 2002; Blau and Kahn, 2003; Rubery, 2008).
Analytical Approach and Data
We use information from two large-scale UK surveys.
The main data set is the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a re-
peated cross-section survey of individuals, which sup-
plies detailed information on employment and has a
substantial sample size. We use LFS data from 1993 to
2008 (annual, though constructed out of quarterly sur-
veys). The second data set is the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS). We use information from the first 17
waves, comprising the period 1991–2007. This allows
us to complement the LFS analysis by minimizing the
confounding effects of individual-specific unobserved
heterogeneity.6
Our approach introduces two variables that measure
in some way the pool of skills in the labour force. The
first is the graduate density of occupations, operational-
ized as the proportion of graduate workers in an occupa-
tion—with graduates defined as holders of first or
higher degrees from higher education institutions.
Graduate density raises wages controlling for individual
education. However, its wage effects are sometimes
negative, which implies overcrowding (Brynin, 2002). If
the supply of graduates rises in line with demand for
high-status occupations more than their prospective eco-
nomic value, this leads to over-qualification. This might
especially apply to women tied by family responsibilities
(Bobbitt-Zeher, 2011). As Ochsenfeld (2014) points out,
sex-specific characteristics that are altered by techno-
logical and organizational developments are often unob-
served. We therefore add a second measure that better
reflects productivity, which we define for our purpose as
factors that enhance wage growth within occupations.
As explained below, we use occupation-level time-series
wage regressions to extract the fixed effect of the
residuals and use it as an indicator of underlying
occupation-specific time-invariant factors that influence
wages.
It should be noted that neither effect is solely that of
occupational productivity. Graduate density is the pro-
portion of graduates in an occupation and is therefore
primarily a measure of skill supply. This need not relate
directly to productivity—for instance, if supply is driven
by the demand for the prestige of a degree rather than
the wages it attracts. The fixed-effect measure, in con-
trast, captures unmeasured aspects of wage growth at
the occupational level. This cannot be driven by individ-
uals. We would therefore expect it to relate more closely
to differential productivity. However, the unmeasured
aspects of productivity picked up by the occupational
fixed effects (OFE) depend on the information that we
are able to enter into the right-hand side of the occupa-
tion-level equation. While this is extensive, there are fac-
tors, such as technology usage at work, which we are
unable to measure.
Our occupation-level wage determination model can
be represented as:
Wot ¼ Fotb1 þGotb2 þ Cotb3 þ Vot; (1)
where subscripts o and t stand for occupation and time,
respectively, W represents mean deflated gross hourly
wages in the occupation, F is the proportion of women
in the occupation (occupational feminization), G is the
proportion of graduates in the occupation (graduate
density), C is a vector of time-varying control variables,
V is an error term, and b1–b3 are parameters of interest
to be estimated. The error term (Vot) can be divided as
follows:
Vot ¼ lo þ eot; (2)
where lo are time-invariant occupation-specific wage
differentials, and eot is the usual stochastic error
term. We estimate average occupational wages by re-
gressing deviations from occupational means over
time in the independent variables on deviations from
the occupational mean over time in the dependent
variable:
Wot Wo ¼ ðFot  FoÞb1 þ ðGot GoÞb2
þ ðCot  CoÞb3 þ ðe ot  eoÞ (3)
The time-invariant occupation-specific wage differen-
tials (lo), which are averaged out of the above equation,
are then retrieved. The resulting term, our OFE, cap-
tures pounds per hour in an occupation over or under
model prediction, net of all observable factors. This will
be used as a proxy for occupational skill demands in
later models.
OFEo ¼ lo ¼ Wo Xot b^ ; (4)
where X is the mean vector of the observable variables
included in the regression, and b^ is the corresponding
vector of estimated model parameters. Entering this into
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individual-level cross-sectional and fixed-effect models,
respectively, gives:
Wit ¼ Fit b 1 þGit b 2 þ Cit b 3 þ Zi b 4 þOFEi b 5 þ Vit (5)
Wit Wi ¼ ðFit  FiÞb 1 þ ðGit GiÞb 2
þ ðCit  CiÞ b 3
þ ðOFEit OFEiÞ b 4 þ ð e it  e iÞ (6)
where Z captures time-constant individual factors. The
model in Equation (5) controls for occupation-level, but
not for individual-level, unobserved factors that deter-
mine wages. The model in Equation (6), which we term
a ‘dual fixed-effect’ model, simultaneously controls for
person-specific and occupation-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity in wages.7 While this accounts for both un-
measured aspects of individual human capital and
occupational skill supply and demand factors, our main
aim is to use the OFE as a proxy indicator of productiv-
ity to see whether this alters the relationship between
gender segregation and the gender wage gap.
Empirical Evidence
Trends in Feminization and the Gender Wage
Gap
Occupational gender segregation and the gender wage gap
have both declined over the period examined in this study,
as is apparent from LFS data presented in Figure 1.
Between 1993 and 2008, the overall gender difference in
inflation-adjusted hourly wages decreased substantially
from £2.2 to £1.1. The within-occupation gap (not shown)
fell from £1.63 to £0.82. With inflation-adjusted average
pay rising, the gender wage gap as a proportion of average
pay decreased over the period from 23.4 to 10.3 per cent.
At the same time, a less impressive though important
fall in the degree of occupational gender segregation
took place. The value of the Duncan and Duncan Index
of Dissimilarity was 0.58 in 1993, indicating that an
estimated 58 per cent of men and women would need to
change occupations for the gender composition of all oc-
cupations to reflect the gender composition of the labour
force. By 2008, this had reduced to 50 per cent.
Extreme forms of gender concentration also declined.
For example, the proportion of employees working in oc-
cupations where women were at least 75 per cent of work-
ers fell from 25 to 20 per cent. Further, the correlation
between occupational feminization and the within-
occupation gender wage gap (male minus female hourly
wage) measured at the occupational level is negative, so
the gender wage gap is smaller in more-feminized occupa-
tions. In fact, the magnitude of this negative correlation
strengthened over the period from 0.05 (non-significant)
to0.30 (highly significant).
These descriptive analyses suggest that women’s poor
wage position relative to men is both declining and
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Figure 1. Time trends in the Duncan Index of Occupational Dissimilarity and the gender gap in hourly wages, LFS (1993–2008)
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decreasingly determined by occupational gender segrega-
tion.8 We now examine whether this is related to gen-
dered skill distributions and unobserved productivity.
The Role of Skills
Most research shows a negative correlation between
gender segregation and wages. Results in Table 1 from
the regression models described in Equation (1), using
LFS data at the occupation level, clearly reflect this
negative relationship. However, occupational femi-
nization has a stronger negative wage impact for men
than women, and more so in the later period. Working
in female-dominated occupations therefore results in
lower within-occupation wage gaps between male and
female workers. The problem is that women by defin-
ition prevail in feminized occupations.
Just as men are more affected than women by the
negative wage impact of feminization, if in small num-
bers, not all women are equally affected. The table also
shows that the magnitude of these negative effects is small
when compared with the effects of graduate density.
Individual-level wage regression models using the
LFS are presented in Tables 2 (men) and 3 (women).
Their estimates are consistent with the above results.
The impact of occupational feminization on wages is
nearly always negative and, in the more complex
specifications, more so for men than women. The effect
of graduate density, as expected, is positive, and slightly
favours women, while its effect again far outweighs that
of gender-based segregation. It seems to matter more
whether men and women work in graduate-typed occu-
pations than in female-typed occupations. This is appar-
ent also in that the negative effect of segregation on
women reduces substantially when controlling for
graduate density.
Further support for our general argument is provided
by an interaction term between feminization and gradu-
ate density in the third column of Tables 2 and 3. Its sign
is negative for men but positive for women.
Interpretation is aided by visual inspection of Figure 2.
Men are always penalized for working in feminized occu-
pations at all levels of the graduate density distribution,
though the penalty is larger in graduate-typed feminized
occupations. In contrast, this combination benefits
women, albeit only slightly. Women do not on average
gain from working in male-typed occupations but per-
form better in graduate female-typed occupations. This is
a key result in terms of the arguments presented above.
It is nevertheless unclear, amongst other things, how
much this is the result of unobserved occupational prod-
uctivity, which might be either directly or indirectly gen-
dered. Occupations become more graduate presumably
Table 1. Wage effect of proportion female and proportion graduate on male and female pay at the
occupational level, ordinary least squares models (LFS 1993–2008)
Male pay Female pay
1993–2000 2001–2008 1993–2000 2001–2008
Proportion female 0.28 1.17*** 0.22 0.54**
Proportion graduate 7.90*** 8.22*** 7.94*** 8.72***
R2 0.77 0.80 0.76 0.79
n (occupation-year observations) 616 656 612 650
Note: Dependent variable: Average deflated male/female hourly wages in the occupation. Controls: average age, average tenure, pro-
portion of workers from an ethnic minority, proportion of workers with school-leaving qualifications.
*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
Table 2. Wage effect of proportion female, proportion graduate, and OFE on male pay at the individ-
ual level, ordinary least squares models (LFS 1993–2008)
Proportion female 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.03
Proportion graduate 0.76 0.83 0.22
Proportion female * Proportion graduate 0.21
OFE 0.08
R2 0.41 0.48 0.48 0.53
n (individuals) 278,637
Note: Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education, married, permanent job, full-time job,
tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. All coefficients are statistically significant at P< .001
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in part because employers increasingly demand graduate
skills, but social demand for education might relate only
poorly to employer demand (Brynin, 2013; Koppera and
Mehta, 2014). Use of the indicator of underlying prod-
uctivity proposed in Equation (4)—the OFE—enables us
to get a clearer picture.
We add this term in column 4 and hence fit the
model depicted in Equation (5). Its effect appears small,
but this is relative to the variable’s range (£3.7 to
£5.5). The result means that for every one-pound
increase in unmeasured productive potential in an occu-
pation, hourly wages increase by roughly 8 per cent.
This favours men insofar as they tend to work in occu-
pations with both higher wages and higher productivity.
Nevertheless, the occupational fixed-effect term has an
equally positive effect on the wages of both men and
women. In this sense, productivity performance within
occupations does not exacerbate gender inequality.
Table 3. Wage effect of proportion female, proportion graduate, and OFE on female pay at the in-
dividual level, ordinary least squares models (LFS 1993–2008)
Proportion female 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.03
Proportion graduate 0.85 0.82 0.36
Proportion female *Proportion graduate 0.06
OFE 0.08
R2 0.44 0.53 0.53 0.56
n (individuals) 284,594
Note: Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education, married, permanent job, full-
time job, tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. All coefficients are statistically significant at P< .001
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Figure 2. Visual representation of interactions between proportion female and proportion graduate in Tables 2 and 3, individual-
level ordinary least squares models (LFS 1993–2008)
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Also of note is that the inclusion of the OFE in the
model greatly reduces the predicted wage advantage
from work in graduate occupations. This implies that
most of the graduate density effects are the result of dif-
ferences in occupational productivity. More important,
for both men and women the negative effects of occupa-
tional feminization on wages can no longer be observed,
which suggests that the gendering of work per se does
not influence their wages. The apparent wage penalties
previously associated with occupational feminization re-
sult from a link between occupational gender segrega-
tion and productivity.
We conclude our main empirical analyses by fitting
the ‘dual fixed-effect’ model suggested in Equation (6),
using the BHPS. Results are presented in Tables 4 (men)
and 5 (women).
The predicted wage effects of graduate density, occu-
pational feminization, and the occupational fixed-effect
term are, with some exceptions, similar to those esti-
mated in the previous specification using LFS data.
However, interesting differences emerge. First, the wage
effect of occupational feminization on wages remains
negative and statistically significant for both men and
women in the presence of an encompassing set of statis-
tical controls, including measures of graduate density,
unobserved occupation-level productivity, and skill de-
mands, as well as unobserved individual-level skills or
capability. This provides indirect evidence for the con-
tinued devaluation of female-typed lines of work.
Nevertheless, the estimated impacts of occupational
feminization reduce to 0.04 for men and 0.07 for
women, which means that a full reversal in the sex com-
position of a worker’s occupation from 100 per cent
‘male’ to 100 per cent ‘female’ would only result in a
4–7 per cent contraction in his/her wages. This is sub-
stantially smaller than in much of the comparable worth
literature (e.g. Groshen, 1991, Cotter et al., 1997,
Magnusson, 2009, Perales, 2013). Second, once the
fixed effects are included in the model, graduate
density has no wage impact for either men or women.
This suggests that wage-enhancing unobserved
factors are a better proxy for occupation-level skill
demands than is the proportion of graduates in an
occupation.
Non-linear and Other Differential Effects
Our theoretical set-up suggested that the wage effects of
occupational feminization may be non-linear across dif-
ferent levels of skill demand and supply. We test this
proposition by estimating models analogous to those in
Tables 2 and 3 that (i) differentiate between graduates
and non-graduates on the one hand and those who work
in occupations with high and low high-graduate density
on the other, and (ii) add second and third-order polyno-
mials of the occupational feminization variable to cap-
ture non-linear effects. The results are presented in
Table 6 and can be more easily interpreted by visual in-
spection of Figure 3.
Taking non-graduates first, increasing levels of femi-
nization reduce both men’s and women’s wages for at
least a part of the range. The overall result is though not
far from flat. The same applies to individuals who do
not work in graduate occupations. For graduates and
those working in graduate occupations, the non-linear
effects are much more visible, though relatively small in
magnitude. Male graduates gain from working in gen-
der-integrated relative to male-dominated occupations
but, at higher levels of feminization, their wages worsen.
The same applies to female graduates, but less so. As we
have stated, education alone is not sufficient to counter-
act the devaluing effect of ‘women’s work’. However,
where this work demands high-level skills, the effect is
generally positive, above all for women, as we see from
the uppermost curve in Figure 3. These results further
demonstrate that graduate status does not protect
against high levels of feminization, whereas working in
a graduate occupation does.
Table 4. Wage effect of proportion female, proportion graduate, and OFE on male pay at the individ-
ual level, ordinary least squares, and fixed-effect models (BHPS 1991–2007)
Ordinary least squares Fixed effects
Proportion female 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.04**
Proportion graduate 0.65*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.00
OFE 0.08*** 0.03***
R2/R2 (within) 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.23 0.23 0.24
n (individuals) 4,642
n (observations) 29,499
Note: Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education, married, permanent job, full-time job,
tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. *P< 0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
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Discussion and Conclusions
Gender-based occupational segregation is clearly an im-
portant organizing principle within labour markets.
There is overwhelming evidence for this, and indeed, we
know much about the factors that have historically led
to its emergence and preservation. A large body of re-
search has demonstrated that doing ‘women’s work’
has a negative impact on men’s and women’s pay, but
how recent changes in the economic structure have af-
fected these relationships is much less clear. Women, we
argue, increasingly work in occupations to which the
changing economic environment has been mostly
beneficial.
First, we present important evidence of a rapid de-
cline in the gender wage gap in the British labour market
between 1993 and 2008. In this period, the gap halved.
This movement towards pay equality was accompanied
by a (not so impressive) decrease in occupational gender
segregation. Between 1993 and 2008, the Index of
Dissimilarity fell from 0.58 to 0.50. This makes the
British example an interesting case study.
At the level of both occupations and individuals, our
results indicate that the underlying demand for skills (in
part captured by the percentage of graduates in each oc-
cupation but primarily by unobserved factors that influ-
ence wage growth within occupations) are gradually
eliminating the predictive impact of occupational gender
segregation on wages. On the other hand, the distinct
and patterned effects of occupational feminization on
wages in previous decades are not disappearing; they are
instead evolving into a more complex constellation of
processes, including differing impacts for graduates and
non-graduates, and for employees in graduate and non-
graduate jobs, as well as non-linear relationships across
the spectrum of feminization. In our view, this makes
understanding the role of gender and the gendering of
occupations in determining labour market outcomes
more rather than less important.
Our research contributes to current knowledge on
underlying changes in the occupational structure, in par-
ticular through the use of OFE to approximate product-
ivity. Nevertheless, this remains only an indirect proxy
measure, and we cannot be certain what this represents:
productivity, demand for skills, technological change, or
demand for particular goods and services? There are
also clearly other wage-enhancing factors that may be
Table 5. Wage effect of proportion female, proportion graduate, and OFE on female pay at the individ-
ual level, ordinary least squares, and fixed-effect models (BHPS 1991–2007)
Ordinary least squares Fixed effects
Proportion female 0.32*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.07***
Proportion graduate 0.84*** 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.06
OFE 0.08*** 0.03***
R2/R2 (within) 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.19 0.20 0.21
n (individuals) 4,961
n (observations) 32,117
Note: Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education, married, permanent job, full-time job,
tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. *P< 0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
Table 6. Non-linear wage effect of proportion female on male and female pay at the individual level, by indi-
vidual and occupational skill groups, ordinary least squares models (LFS 1993–2008)
Graduates Non-graduates Graduate occupations Non-graduate occupations
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Proportion female 0.20*** 0.06 0.09*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.42*** 0.10*** 0.36***
Proportion female2 0.39** 0.29 0.29*** 0.40*** 1.01*** 0.90*** 0.24*** 0.51***
Proportion female3 0.07 0.13 0.30*** 0.15*** 0.72** 0.58** 0.26*** 0.16***
R2 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.32 0.28 0.49 0.49
n (observations) 53,185 49,300 229,600 239,167 47,999 39,113 230,638 245,481
Note: Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education (columns 3 and 4), married, permanent job,
full-time job, tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. *P<0.05, ** P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
European Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 0, No. 0 9
 at A
lbert Slom
an Library, U
niversity of Essex on January 13, 2016
http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
important. Above all, this measure is not informative as
to the specific types of skill that play a role in wage de-
termination processes. Nevertheless, our findings sug-
gest that researchers should perhaps shift focus from the
study of the extent and impacts of occupational segrega-
tion to the examination of gendered process of occupa-
tional change, in particular to what this means for
changing valuations of both women’s work and wom-
en’s skills. These two concepts have different implica-
tions for women.
An earlier period of exploitation of female labour is
giving way to an inexorable process of change. Previous
research has stressed the importance of sociopolitical at-
titude change and gender mainstreaming policies in im-
proving the situation of women in the labour market
(England, 2010). Our findings complement this body of
evidence by highlighting the role of exogenous trans-
formations in the occupational structure and the distri-
bution of skills, which could for instance reflect
technological change or shifts in the global division of
labour. These have in principle little to do with gender
per se; yet, they have been important drivers of current
trends towards gender equality at work. In this sense, ar-
guments for a declining significance of gender in work
outcomes are not misguided. Whether that will remain
the case, though, particularly with the emergence of
widespread economic recession, is uncertain.
The improvement in women’s labour market stand-
ing has been steady but not overwhelming; changes in
the occupational structure have also almost exclusively
benefited highly educated women. Even if these women
are an increasing proportion of the female workforce,
many poorly educated women work for little reward.
Thus, while women’s work is not devalued across
the board, the power of occupational segregation to re-
duce the welfare of women unable to benefit from
the rising demand for female skills is a continuing
concern.
Notes
1 An alternative view is offered by ‘queuing theory’
(Thurow, 1979). This posits that women are con-
centrated in a smaller number of occupations than
Figure 3. Visual representation of non-linear effects of proportion female on wages in Table 6, individual-level ordinary least
squares models (LFS 1993–2008)
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men, which increases competition amongst women
for jobs and also employers’ power to set compara-
tively low wages in female-dominated occupations
(Fernandez and Moors, 2008).
2 One further prediction of devaluation theory is
that, at least if female skills are undervalued, there
should be excess female overqualification.
Overqualification is common amongst both men
and women (Borghans and de Grip, 2000; Korpi
and Tahlin 2009), but there is only limited evidence
of a gender differential in its incidence or wage ef-
fects (e.g. Olsen et al, 2010: 33–41).
3 It must be noted that not all available research evi-
dence supports this notion. For instance, de Ruijter,
van Doorne-Huiskes, and Schippers (2003) find
that even though female-dominated occupations
often suffer labour shortages, wages in female-
dominated occupations where skills are in demand
are in fact relatively low. This is however the Dutch
case, where regulatory forces have a strong wage
impact.
4 Koppera and Mehta (2014) also find, as does
Goldin (2008), that what benefits men in the long
term is work experience. With low work experi-
ence, the college premium is almost equal between
men and women, but as this rises, so does the male
advantage. This may be responsible for the higher
returns to education for men noted above in several
countries.
5 A specific example of change in the structure of an
occupation in Britain is the printing industry, a
traditionally male-dominated, skilled, highly paid
environment. Technological developments that
made this industry obsolete simultaneously raised
the demand for computer skills, and therefore the
rewards offered in highly computerized, less male-
typed occupations such as journalism, graphic de-
sign, and publishing (Cockburn, 1983; Brynin,
2006).
6 The British occupational coding system underwent
substantial modification from SOC90 to SOC2000
in 2000, which means that there is little compar-
ability between specific occupations before and
after this. Our analysis is, though, not of specific oc-
cupations but of occupational characteristics at a
comparable level of occupational aggregation,
minor occupational groups (81 in SOC90 and 88 in
SOC2000). We therefore assume comparability
over time. While it is possible that the coding
change has some influence on the results, this is un-
likely, as robustness checks using several time
points show consistent trends.
7 This tackles in a different way the problem ad-
dressed by the multilevel models of de Ruijter, van
Doorne-Huiskes, and Schippers (2003). These simi-
larly allow for simultaneous variation at both the
individual and occupational levels, but make strong
distributional assumptions about the occupation
fixed effects.
8 The mean feminization level is substantially higher
amongst female non-graduates (68 per cent) than
amongst female graduates (57 per cent). This could
suggest that educated women gain from doing
‘men’s’ work, but as the figures for men are only 27
and 38 per cent, respectively, the implication is a
growth in ‘female’ graduate jobs.
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